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ST A TEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings. 
Plaintiff Stilwyn, Inc. ("Stilwyn") appeals from the District Court, Fifth Judicial District, 
Blaine County's ("District Court") decision on summary judgment that it is barred from bringing 
tort claims against the Defendants by virtue of its participation as an intervenor in a prior action, 
the Federal Case described herein. R., Vol. V, p. 1091-1102. 
The operative complaint is Stilwyn's Second Amended complaint filed on March 20, 
2012. Defendant Idaho First Bank ("IFB" or "Idaho First") answered the Second Amended 
complaint. The facts underlying Stilwyn' s claims arising out of the chronology of filings, 
representations, and rulings therein are not in dispute. 
IFB filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on March 9, 2013 on the grounds that 
Stilwyn's claims were barred by the doctrine of res judicata. R. Vol. II, p. 381-83. On April 5, 
2013, Defendant Robert A. Kantor and Defendants Rokan Corporation and Rokan Partners 
joined IFB's Motion for Summary Judgment. Id. at 427-29, 430-39. The Page Defendants then 
filed their notice of joinder on April 9, 2013. Id. at 454-56. 
Stilwyn opposed the motions for summary judgment, arguing that its claims were not 
compulsory counterclaims in the Federal Case and were not barred by application ofres judicata. 
The Defendants filed reply memoranda. R., Vol. V, p.1047-72, 1073-80, 1081-87. The 
District Court heard oral argument on June 18, 2013. 
On this record, the District Court issued a Memorandum Decision Granting Defendants 
Motion for Summary Judgment, filed July 23, 2013. Id. at 1091-1102. The court applied 
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the doctrine of res judicata, specifically, claim preclusion, to find that Stihvyn should have and 
could have asserted all of its claims (counterclaims and third-party claims) in the Federal Case. 
On September 12, 2013, the District Court entered an Amended Judgment in favor of all 
Defendants and dismissed the case in its entirety. Id. at 1133-35. Stilwyn filed its Notice of 
Appeal on September 17, 2013. Id. at 1136-41. 
The Defendants all requested an award of attorney fees and costs under J.C. § § 12-121 
and 12-123. R., Vol. V, p. 1112-24, 1142-1200, 1201-73, 1274-86. On December 2, 2013 (filed 
December 26, 2013 ), the District Court entered its Memorandum Opinion on Motion for Costs 
and Attorney's Fees. Id. at 1296-1304. In its discretion, the district court denied the Defendants' 
motions for attorney fees, but granted an award of costs in the amount of $61.00 to the Page 
Defendants and $58.00 to IFB. Id. at 1303. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. The District Court did not commit reversible error as a matter of law in its 
interpretation, construction, and application of I.R.C.P. 13(a), or in its conclusion that Stilwyn 
was required to assert compulsory counterclaims and third-party claims in the Federal Case. 
2. The District Court did not commit reversible error as a matter of law in its 
interpretation, construction, and application of the doctrine ofres judicata ( claim preclusion) or 
in its conclusion that Stilwyn's claims were barred by reason of Stilwyn's involvement in the 
Federal Case. 
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3. The District Court did not commit reversible error as a matter of law in failing to 
adopt and apply the declaratory judgment exception found in Restatement (Second) of 
Judgments§ 33 to the facts of this case. 
4. The District Court erred in not granting Idaho First's motion for attorney fees 
pursuant to LC. §12-121 and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l). 
A. Attorney Fees on Appeal 
Idaho First is entitled to attorney fees pursuant to J.C. §12-121. For all the reasons 
discussed in this submission, Stilwyn's continuing efforts to revive its claims in the face of the 
effect of res judicata are made frivolously, unreasonably and without foundation. See, e.g., 
Urrutia v. Harrison, 2014 Ida. LEXIS 192 (Idaho July 31, 2014) ("An overall view of the case 
establishes that the appeal was pursued unreasonably" and attorney fees appropriate on appeal 
pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121 ). Thus, Defendant Idaho First should be granted its attorney 
fees, including those on appeal. 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
A. Factual Basis for Summary Judgment - Federal Case Chronology and 
Proceedings 
1. Introduction 
In its "Introduction" to Appellant's Opening Brief ("App. Br."), Stilwyn deemed it 
"necessary to set forth the genesis of and procedural history, decision, and judgment in the 
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[Federal Case 1]. App.Br. I. Despite Stilwyn's characterizations, editorial comments and legal 
conclusions, it provided a general summary of the chronology of the proceedings and certain 
events between September 2009 and Judge Winrnill's February 13, 2011 Court's Memorandum 
Decision and Order ("Fed.Ct. Order"). App.Br. 2-4; R.,Vol. II, p. 305-18. 
During Stilwyn's fact recitation and later, Stilwyn attempted to minimize and downplay 
its level of participation and role in the Federal Case. App.Br. 4 ("Given the limited nature of its 
intervention, Stilwyn .... ") (emphasis added); Id. at 6 ("Stilwyn was not a signatory to the 
Stipulation .... "); Id. at 11 ( describing itself as "an intervenor who did not execute the 
stipulation."); and, Id. at 31 ( disclaiming its "involvement" as an intervenor in the Federal Case.) 
2. The Portfolio Complaint and FDIC Counterclaim 
Stilwyn also repeatedly sought to characterize the Federal Case solely as a declaratory 
judgment action brought by then Plaintiffs, Anaconda Investments, LLC, and Portfolio FB-
Idaho, LLC ("Anaconda/Portfolio") against the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
("FDIC"). App.Br. 3; R.,Vol. II, p. 518-19. When the FDIC removed Anaconda/Portfolio's state 
court action to federal court the FDIC filed its Answer and Counterclaim against 
Anaconda/Portfolio on August 11,2010. R., Vol. III, p. 566-585. In its Answer, the FDIC 
admits: 
• Stilwyn's loan was secured by Blaine County property (R., Vol. III, p. 576-577, il 5), 
1 Portfolio FB-Idaho, LLC v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., No. 1: 10-cv-00377-BLW (D. Idaho June 
28,2011). 
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• First Bank of Idaho ("FBI") held a participation interest in the loan, the FDIC was 
appointed receiver for FBI (Id. at 577,, 6-7), 
• FDIC took control of FBI's interest in the Stilwyn loan (Id. ,7), 
• Idaho First Bank ("IFB") submitted the highest bid for the Stilwyn loan but alleges it was 
not the successful bidder because it violated the FDIC auction terms since there was a 
"prearrangement for the purchase" and FDIC notified IFB it would not close on the sale 
of FBI's interest in the Stilwyn loan. (Id. il 8). 
The FDIC also pied seven affirmative defenses, including: 
• "unclean hands" (First Affirmative Defense), 
• "conduct of others" (Second Affirmative Defense), 
• Anaconda/Portfolio's fraud (Third Affirmative Defense), 
• Anaconda/Portfolio's bad faith (Fifth Affirmative Defense), 
• Failure of consideration (Sixth Affirmative Defense). Id. at 578. 
In its Counterclaim against Anaconda/Portfolio, the FDIC made the following general 
allegations: 
• FBI made a $9.5 million loan to Stilwyn the purpose of which was to construct five 
homes in the Weyyakin Subdivision in Sun Valley, Idaho. Id. at 579,, 6. 
• Robert M. Smelick and Gail S. Smelick signed a promissory note and executed a deed of 
trust on behalf of Stilwyn. Id. at 580, il 7. 
• The deed of trust was recorded in Blaine County on May 18, 2007). Id. at 580,, 8. 
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• FBI sold a 42% participation interest in the Stihvyn loan to Farmers National Bank, NA 
and retained a 58% interest. Id. ,i 9. 
• FDIC was appointed receiver for FBI and took over FBI's interest in the Stilwyn loan on 
April 24, 2009. Id. iJ 10. 
• The Stilwyn loan was included in an auction on September 29, 2009. Id. ,i 11. 
• The FDIC sale was a bank-only bidder sale and banks could not enter into negotiations or 
make agreement with a non-bank before a sale of the assets closed. Id. ,i 12. 
• IFB submitted the highest bid for the Stilwyn loan interest. Id. ,i 13. 
• After the auction, IFB wired funds for closing the Stilwyn loan. Id. at 581, ,i 14. 
• The FDIC learned IFB entered into a prearranged purchase of the participation which 
violated the auction rules. Id. il 15. 
• October 27, 2009, the FDIC notified IFB it would not close the sale of the Stilwyn loan 
participation. Id. il 16. 
• November 16, 2009, the FDIC and IFB agreed the sale of the Stilwyn participation "was 
never consummated". Id. ,i 17. 
• November 16, 2009, all funds were returned to IFB. Id. il 18. 
• February 17, 2010, an Assignment and Assumption of Interest and Obligations between 
Anaconda and Portfolio ("Assignment") was recorded in Blaine County by Anaconda 
against the Stilwyn property. Id. ,i 19. 
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• In the Assignment, Anaconda and Portfolio allege the FDIC transferred the Stilwyn 
participation to IFB on October 22, 2009 and then IFB transferred that interest to 
Anaconda. Id., 20. 
• On May 10, 2010, the FDIC demanded Anaconda/Portfolio release the Assignment and 
Anaconda/Portfolio did not comply. Id. il 21. 
• July 15, 2010, Anaconda/Portfolio recorded a Notice of Lis Pendens against the Stilwyn 
property in Blaine County. Id. at 582, il 22. 
The FDIC's First Cause of Action against Anaconda/Portfolio on its counterclaim was for 
slander of title. In that Cause, the FDIC alleged: 
• "By recording the Assignment, Anaconda and Portfolio have uttered and published 
slanderous words regarding its rights in relation to the [Stilwyn] Real Property." Id., 24. 
• Anaconda/Portfolio knew the sale of the Stilwyn participation was not closed and they 
had no interest in the Stilwyn real prope1iy. Id. il 25. 
• Anaconda/Portfolio acted maliciously in trying to cloud the interest in the Stilwyn real 
property. Id. il 26. 
• The cloud on title to the Stilwyn real property created by filing the Assignment and 
Notice of Lis Pendens "inhibited" the FDIC's ability to sell the Stilwyn loan 
participation. Id., 27. 
• The FDIC was damaged by recording the Assignment and the refusal to remove it from 
title records. Id., 28. 
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3. Case Management Order 
Judge Winmill entered a Case Management Order ("Management Order") in the Federal 
Case on October 19, 2010. Case Management Order, supra note 1, Oct. 19, 2010, ECF No. 15.2 
In the Management Order, the Court set January 14, 2011 as the deadline for"[ a ]11 motions to 
amend pleadings and join parties .... [because] [a]ll parties are entitled to know the claims and 
parties well-before trial rather than be forced to pursue or defend against a moving target." Id. at 
2. 
4. FDIC Counterclaim - Slander Title 
The FDIC's counterclaim significantly deepened the waters into which Stilwyn 
intentionally dove when, "[ o ]n the eve of the hearings on the cross-motions [ for summary 
judgment], Stilwyn sought to intervene to file briefing in support of the FDIC's opposition to the 
Anaconda/Portfolio motion." App.Br. 4. When Stilwyn intervened as a Defendant on December 
3, 2010, the FDIC's tort counterclaim had expanded the scope and focus of the Federal Case. 
The FDIC claimed it was damaged. R., Vol. III, p. 582, ,r 28. The FDIC's counterclaim 
allegations form the core fact pattern Stilwyn relied on during the remaining iterations of this 
litigation. 
5. Summary Judgment Motions 
Two motions for summary judgment were pending when Stilwyn moved to intervene on 
December 3, 2010. R., Vol. III, p. 704. Plaintiffs Anaconda/Portfolio moved for Summary 
Judgment with accompanying documentation on September 9, 2010 (Anaconda/Portfolio MSJ''). 
2 Inclusion of this Order in the record is subject to a pending Motion to Augment. 
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Id. at 591-617. In its motion for summary judgment, Anaconda/Portfolio requested the Court 
declare Portfolio to be "the legal owner of First Bank ofldaho's interest in the Stilwyn Inc. loan 
including but not limited to the security interests related to said loan." Id at 592. Defendant, 
FDIC filed its Memorandum of Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation as Receiver for First 
Bank in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment ("FDIC Opp. Memo.") with 
supporting affidavits on October 4,2010. R., Vol. III, p. 618-641. The FDIC argued (1) the 
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to rule on Plaintiffs' claims; (Id. at 624-626) (2) lack of 
privity of contract between Plaintiffs and the FDIC, (Id. at 626-627) and, (3) any contract 
between the FDIC and IFB had been rescinded (Id. at 627-628). 
Next, the FDIC filed its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment3 on October 21, 2010. Id. 
at 642-662. It argued "recording of the Portfolio Assignment and Lis Pendens was without 
authorization of the FDIC-Rand clouds the FDIC-R's property interest in the real property" and 
requested "an order directing the Plaintiffs to release the Portfolio Assignment and Lis Pendens." 
Id. at 646. The hearing on the summary judgment motions was scheduled for December 9, 2010. 
Id. at 672. But, it was vacated pending Stilwyn's Motion to Intervene. Id. 
6. Stilwyn's Motion to Intervene 
The Motion to Intervene as Defendant by Stilwyn, Inc. ("Motion to Intervene")(R., Vol. 
III, p. 673-685), Memorandum in Support of Motion to Intervene as Defendant by Stilwyn, Inc. 
("Intervene Memo. ")(Id. at 686-706), and the Declaration of Robert M. Smelick in Support of 
3 The FDIC's summary judgment motion requested "an order directing the Plaintiffs to release 
the Portfolio Assignment and Lis Pendens." It did not ask for summary judgment on its 
counterclaim for slander of title. R., Vol. III, p. 646. 
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Stilwyn, Inc.'s Motion to Intervene as a Defendant ("Smelick Dec.")(/d. at 707-716) demonstrate 
that Stilwyn keenly knew of the detailed facts of the FDIC auction and the subsequent events 
created by Anaconda/Portfolio. Stilwyn moved to intervene under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2) as a 
matter of right and under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b), permissive intervention. Id. at 673. In the body 
of the Motion to Intervene, Stilwyn represented to the Com1 that: 
Stilwyn has an agreement with Farmers National Bank to restructure the Stilwyn 
Loan, provided Farmers is able to purchase the FDIC's interest in the loan. The 
plaintiffs claim they hold the FDIC's interest in the Stilwyn loan and have filed a 
lis pendens on the property. Plaintiffs have thus placed a cloud on the property 
and prevented Stilwyn from pursuing its agreement with Farmers. 
Stilwyn thus has significant protectable interests related to the subject matter of 
the litigation, and, as both a legal and practical matter, its interests in the loan and 
the real property will be directly affected by the outcome of the litigation. If the 
plaintiffs were to succeed, Stilwyn faces, among other things, the loss of its 
property rights; the loss of its opportunity to restructure the loan and market the 
houses already constructed with the proceeds of the loan; and loss of the right to 
pay off the loan and develop the remaining 14 buildable lots on the property. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Id. at 674. 
In its Intervene Memo, Stilwyn asserted that "[i]n perhaps the most practical sense 
imaginable, Stilwyn's ability to protect its property rights, its investment, and its pursuit of the 
opportunity to finalize the restructure of its loan will be "disadvantaged" if the Plaintiffs are 
granted the relief they want." Id. at 701. 
Stilwyn's president, Robert M. Smelick's ("Smelick"), testimony to support the Motion 
to Intervene declared: 
ill 9 "By the mid-summer of 2010, Stilwyn had reached an agreement with 
Farmers to restructure its loan. Farmers had, in turn, reached an agreement with 
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the FDIC by which it would acquire the FDIC's interest in the Stilwyn loan. 
However, these agreements are contingent upon the cloud on the title to the 
property resulting from the actions taken by Portfolio-FE and Anaconda, the 
plaintiffs in this case, being removed." 
ir20 "I decided that Stilwyn must seek to intervene as a party in this litigation in 
order to protect its interests and property rights in the Weyyakin property. Time is 
of the essence, and Stilwyn needs this litigation resolved expeditiously so that it 
may finalize the restructure of its loan with Farmers and pursue the marketing of 
the houses to make payments on that loan." 
Id. at 711-712. 
Stilwyn continued to assert its "direct, practical, and legal interest in the outcome of [the 
Federal Case]". Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Intervene as Defendant by Stilwyn, 
Inc., supra note 1, Dec. 15, 2010, ECF No. 26.4 "Stilwyn has significant protcctable interests in 
the subject matter of this litigation and that, as both a legal and practical matter, the preservation 
of Stilwyn's property rights, contract rights, and economic survival depend on the outcome of the 
litigation." Id. at 1. 
Judge Winmill granted Stilwyn's motion to intervene on December 17,2010, 
Memorandum Decision and Order on Stilwyn, Inc. 's Motion to Intervene ("Intervention 
Decision"). R., Vol. III, p. 725-734. The Court there found that "Stilwyn has shown significant 
protectable interests relating to the loan and the encumbered property that is the subject of this 
action." Id. at 729. 
4 Inclusion of this pleading in the record is subject to a pending Motion to Augment. 
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7. Stilwyn's Opposition to Summary Judgment 
On December 27, 2010, Stilwyn filed Defendant Intervenor Stilwyn, Inc. 's Memorandum 
in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment ("Stilwyn MSJ Opp. Memo."), Id. at 
735-755; Stilwyn, Inc.'s Statement of Undisputed Facts in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Summary Judgment ("Stilwyn's MSJ Undisputed Facts"), Id. at 756-768; the Declaration of 
Mike Hamilton [in opposition to motion for summary judgment] ("Hamilton Dec."), Id. at 769-
773; and, the Declaration of B. Newal Squyres [in opposition to motion for summary judgment] 
("Squyres' Dec.") to which were attached Exhibits A through H, supra note 1, Dec. 23, 2010. 
ECF No. 30-3.5 
Stilwyn's MSJ Opposition Memorandum and the related filings demonstrate that as of 
December 27,2010, Stilwyn had intimate and detailed knowledge of all aspects of the 
September-October 2009 FDIC loan auction and the subsequent steps taken by Anaconda/ 
Portfolio to claim ownership in the Stilwyn Loan. R., Vol. III, pp. 737-741; 758-767. 
In opposing Anaconda/Portfolio's summary judgment motion, Stilwyn argued: 
• There was no transfer of the Stil wyn Loan from the FDIC to IFB therefore IFB could 
not transfer whatever interest IFB may have had to Anaconda. Id. at 743-746. 
• Any agreements between IFB and Anaconda were void and unenforceable. Id. at 
746-750. 
5 Inclusion of this pleading in the record is subject to a pending Motion to Augment. 
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• Anaconda/Portfolio were not in privity of contract with the FDIC therefore the FDIC 
had no contractual duty to deliver the Stilwyn Loan to IFB or Anaconda/Portfolio. Id. at 
750-751. 
• Anaconda/Portfolio as assignees of IFB's interest in the Stilwyn Loan took no greater 
interest than IFB and are subject to the same defenses the FDIC could assert against IFB. 
Id. at 751-752. 
• Anaconda/Portfolio were not holders in and were subject to the FDIC's claim of 
ownership under Idaho Code § 28-3-306. Id. at 752-753. 
• The FD IC had no duty to transfer the Stilwyn Loan because of IFB' s breach of a 
condition precedent. Id. at 753-754. 
Stilwyn summarized its opposition to Anaconda/Portfolio's summary judgment by 
concluding Plaintiffs could not establish any rights in the Stilwyn Loan and requested the Court 
to " ... order Plaintiffs to remove all clouds on the title to the Real Property created by Plaintiffs, 
including the Portfolio Assignment recorded on February 17, 2010 as Instrument No. 575198, 
and the Notice of Lis Pendens recorded on July 15, 2010 as Instrument No. 579070." Id. at 754. 
The depth of Stilwyn's factual knowledge of the Federal case within ten days of its 
intervention is illustrated by its detailed statement of undisputed facts used to support the 
opposition to the summary judgment motion. R., Vol. III, p. 756-768. In that filing Stilwyn 
presented a thoughtful, well-organized recitation of the events culminating in the filing of the 
Federal Case. Stilwyn, drawing from several sources, explained: 
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• "The Factual Background for the Stilwyn Loan Leading to the FDIC's Bank-Only 
Auction" Id. at 758-759, ,r~ 1-7. 
• "The FDIC Established Strict Conditions and Requirements for Eligibility to Bid in 
the Bank-Only Auction" Id. at 759-762, ~~ 8-18. 
• "Idaho First Bank Decides to Submit a Bid for the Stilwyn Loan and Certifies its 
Compliance with the Requirements for Eligibility to Bid and Purchase the Loan" Id. at 
762, ~,r 19-22. 
• "Anaconda is Formed and IFB then Agrees to Assign it Interest in the Stilwyn Loan, 
Thus Violating the Rules of the Auction" Id. at 762-764, ~~ 23-33. 
• "Based on IFB's Violation of the Bid Requirements, the FDIC Refused to Close on 
the Sale of the Stilwyn Loan and Agreed with IFB to Rescind the Transaction" Id. at 765, 
~~ 34-36. 
• "IFB Assigns its Interest in the Stilwyn Loan After Acknowledging Its Violation of 
the Bid Documents, Demanding the Return oflts Consideration and Despite Knowing the 
FDIC Considered it to Have Breached the Conditions of the Bid Documents" Id. at 765-
767, ~~ 37-44. 
• "Over Three Months Later, Anaconda Assigned its Alleged Interest in the Stilwyn 
Loan to Portfolio" Id. at 767, ~~45-46. 
As additional factual support for its opposition to the Anaconda/Portfolio summary 
judgment motion, Stilwyn filed the Declaration of Mike Hamilton ("Hamilton Dec."), Id. at 769-
773. Hamilton testified as the President of The Farmers National Bank of Buhl, Idaho about 
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his bank's participation in the Stilwyn Loan; the nature of a bank-only auction and his interaction 
with Anaconda. Id. at 769-772, ri: 1, 2-8, 9-15. 
Stilwyn's final submission in opposition to Plaintiff's summary judgment was counsel's 
declaration to which was attached Exhibits A through H. Declaration of B. Newal Squyres, 
supra note 1, Dec. 23, 2010, ECF No. 30-3. The attached exhibits provide documentary 
evidence of the nature of the various entities Stilwyn refers to in its opposition briefing. 
8. Stilwyn's Answer and Affirmative Defenses to Anaconda/Portfolio's 
Complaint 
December 27, 2010, Stilwyn filed its "Answer to Plaintiffs' Verified Complaint for 
Declaratory Judgment by Stilwyn, Inc." ("Stilwyn Answer"). R., Vol. III, p. 774-782. Besides 
admitting and denying Anaconda/Portfolio's allegations and claims, Stilwyn pled seventeen 
"Affirmative Defenses." Id. at 778-780. While most of the affirmative defenses parallel the 
same arguments Stilwyn made in opposition to the summary judgment motion, several were a 
preview of the claims Stilwyn makes in the present case. Affirmative defense number 11 alleges 
"Plaintiffs are guilty of bad faith in connection with the events alleged in Plaintiffs' Complaint." 
Id. at 780, ~ 11. Compare this to the more fully detailed version of Stilwyn's "Second Claim for 
Relief (Abuse of Process) alleged in its Second Amended Complaint ("SAC") filed in Blaine 
County (R., Vol. I, p. 70-96) where Stilwyn alleged in part: 
111. Anaconda Investments was organized and used in pai1 by Kantor and Page 
for the improper purpose of asserting unlawful and illegitimate ownership 
interests in the Stilwyn Loan. 
112. Portfolio FB-Idaho was organized and used for the improper purpose of 
asserting unlawful and illegitimate ownership interests in the Stilwyn Loan. 
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113. The improper purpose of using these legal entities was to create a legal 
document (the Assignment) to be recorded in Blaine County to cloud title to the 
Stilwyn property. 
114. On or about July 8, 2010, Anaconda Investments and Portfolio FB-Idaho 
filed a Declaratory Judgment complaint in the District Court of the Fifth Judicial 
District, Blaine County asserting ownership rights in the Stilwyn Loan. 
115. Defendants had an ulterior, improper purpose in organizing Anaconda and 
Portfolio and in filing the Declaratory Judgment complaint. 
Id. at 87-88, ~ii 111-115; See also, Fifth Claim for Relief (Disregard of Corporate Identity), Id. 
at 90-91, ~~ 139-148; and, Ninth Claim for Relief (Spoliation), Id. at 93-94, ~~ 166-174. 
Stilwyn alleged in affirmative defense number 13, of the Stilwyn Answer, 
Anaconda/Portfolio's "damages, if any, were caused by superseding and intervening acts and/or 
negligence of other parties over whom Defendant had not control and for whose actions 
Defendant is not liable." R., Vol. III, p. 780. In its Second Amended Complaint, "Seventh 
Claim for Relief (Aiding/ Abetting - Acting in Concert)," Stilwyn alleged: 
156. Some or all of the Defendants helped plan, participated in, encouraged and 
agreed to assist in violating the FDIC "bank-only" rules, violated Plaintiffs rights 
or intentionally acted with each other (and with other individuals) to deprive 
Plaintiff of its rights and interest in the Stilwyn Loan and related real property and 
benefitted by facilitating a non-bank to bid on and attempt to purchase the 58% 
interest in the Stilwyn Loan. 
157. Defendants, including some or all of the individual Defendants, acted with 
other to slander title to, to intentionally interfere with prospective economic 
advantage, to abuse process, and to defame. 
158. Defendants, including some or all of the individual Defendants, acted with 
each other to facilitate an unlawful objective in an unlawful manner by violating 
the "bank-only" rules. 
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R., Vol. I, p. 92, ,r,r 156-158. 
While the allegations in this claim are vague and non-specific, they implicated an 
interaction among various parties intending to cause Stilwyn harm. In light of Stilwyn's detailed 
factual due diligence, it is difficult to imagine it did not have some notion of who these "other 
parties" were. This is especially so in light of the extensive enumeration and the detailed 
descriptions of the additional defendants Stilwyn names in the three iterations of its Complaint 
filed in this case. R., Vol. I, p. 19-23, ,rif 5-26; Id. at 46-49, ,r,r 5-23; and, Id. at 71-75, ,r,r 5-21. 
In affirmative defense number 14, Stilwyn Answer, Stilwyn alleges Anaconda/Portfolio 
"committed fraud." R., Vol. III, p. 780, ,r 14. This is the same allegation Stilwyn raised as a 
claim in its Second Amended Complaint, i.e., "Sixth Claim for Relief (Fraudulent Transfer). R., 
Vol. I, p. 91-92, ,r,r 149-153. The Sixth Claim is more specific than the affirmative defense, 
relying on Idaho Code§ 55-913(1) as a basis for its fraud claim. Nevertheless, Stilwyn's 
allegation in its claim is that Anaconda committed a fraud. Id. at 92, ,r 151. 
Stilwyn's Fifteenth affirmative defense alleges that Anaconda knew about the bank-only 
auction rule "and sought to circumvent the rule by colluding with IFB." R., Vol. III, p. 780, ,r15_ 
When Stilwyn moved to intervene in the Federal Case, it had a firm grasp on the events 
surrounding the FDIC auction. Id. at 691-697. Stihvyn explained in detail the steps leading up 
to the auction, how the auction was conducted, and post-auction events. Id. It also knowledgably 
discussed and argued the arcane intricacies of the bank auction process. Id. 
Stilwyn also alleged that Anaconda/Portfolio had "failed to include an indispensable 
party" as its sixteenth affirmative defense. Id. at 780, ,r16. While not disclosing to which party it 
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was referring, it is highly likely the only non-Anaconda/Portfolio party with any potential role in 
the events leading up to the Federal Case would have been Idaho First. IFB was well-known to 
Stilwyn at the time of its intervention and it knew ofIFB's role in the FDIC auction. id. at 691-
697. 
9. Deadline to Amend Pleadings Expired January 14, 2011 
Under the Federal Case's Case Management Order, January 14, 2011, was the deadline 
for "[a]ll motions to amend pleadings and join parties." Case Management Order, at 2. 
10. Stilwyn's Joinder in FDIC Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
January 20, 2011, Stilwyn filed "Stilwyn's Joinder in Defendant's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment" in which it joined the "FDIC-R in seeking an Order from this Court 
declaring that Plaintiffs have no right or interest in the Stilwyn Loan and requiring Plaintiffs to 
remove all clouds on the title to the Real Property created by Plaintiffs, including the Portfolio 
Assignment and Lis Pendens." R., Vol. III, p. 783-784. 
Oral argument on the summary judgment motions was held on January 25, 2011. The 
Court took the matter under advisement. Id. at 786. 
January 26, 2011, the day after the summary judgment oral argument, Anaconda/ 
Portfolio filed a Motion to Supplement the Record with Additional Written Argument ("Motion 
to Supplement") in which Anaconda/Portfolio argued there was additional evidence that the 
FDIC had sold the Stilwyn Loan to IFB. Plaintiffs' Motion to Supplement the Record with 
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Additional Written Argument, supra note 1, Jan. 26, 2011, ECF No. 37.6 The Court granted the 
Motion to Supplement on January 27, 2011. R., Vol. III, p. 550. 
11. Federal Court Order on Summary Judgment Motions 
On February 1, 2011, the FDIC and Stilwyn each filed Responses to the Motion to 
Supplement. See Brief of Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation as Receiver for First Bank of 
Idaho in Response to Plaintiffs' Motion to Supplement the Record with Additional Written 
Argument, supra note 1, Feb. 1, 2011, ECF No. 39 and Stilwyn's Response to Plaintiffs' Motion 
to Supplement the Record with Additional Written Argument ("Stilwyn's Response to Motion to 
Supplement"), Feb. 1, 2011, ECF No. 40. 7 In Stilwyn's Response to Motion to Supplement, it 
carefully explained and argued to the Court why the sale of the Stilwyn Loan from the FDIC to 
IFB was a failed transaction. It had failed to close because "the FDIC and IFB never completed 
or fully executed all of the documents, no transfer of the Stilwyn Note ever occurred, and the 
parties themselves, through their actions and communications, manifested an intention not to 
close." Stilwyn's Response to Motion to Supplement, at 3. Following Stilwyn's summary of its 
arguments, it detailed the facts underlying its arguments and the supporting legal authorities. Id. 
at 1-8. 
February 13, 2011, Judge Winmill issued a Memoranduni. Decision and Order denying 
Anaconda/Portfolio's motion for summary judgment and granting the FDIC/Stilwyn motion for 
6 Inclusion of this pleading in the record is subject to a pending Motion to Augment. 
7 Inclusion of this pleading in the record is subject to a pending Motion to Augment. 
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partial summary judgment. R., Vol. III, p. 787-790; R., Vol. IV, p. 791-800. The Court found 
"the Portfolio Assignment and Lis Pendens was improper." R., Vol. IV, p. 799. 
A five-day trial on the remaining issues was set for July 11, 2011. Id. at 829-834. 
12. FDIC Motion to Enforce Ruling 
Despite the Court's rulings on the summary judgment motions, Anaconda/Portfolio 
refused to release the Portfolio Assignment. In response, on April 4, 2011, the FDIC moved to 
enforce the Court's earlier order, Defendant's Motion to Enforce Memorandum Decision and 
Order ("FDIC's Motion to Enforce"). Id. at 835-838. Anaconda/Portfolio filed its Opposition to 
the FDIC's Motion to Enforce on April 28, 2011, Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendant's Motion 
to Enforce Memorandum Decision and Order (Dkt. No. 51) ("Anaconda/Portfolio Opposition"). 
Id. at 839-846. Stilwyn filed its reply to Anaconda/Portfolio's Opposition on May 5, 2011. 
Intervenor Stilwyn, Inc.'s Reply to Plaintiffs' Opposition to the FDIC's Motion to Enforce 
Memorandum Decision and Order (Dkt. 51 )("Stilwyn Reply to Opposition"), supra note 1, May 
16, 2011, ECF No. 56. 8 
In Stilwyn's Reply to Opposition, Stilwyn summarized the procedural posture of the case 
and correctly stated that "[t]he only claim remaining in the case after the Court's Summary 
Judgment Decision is the counterclaim for slander of title now being pursued by Stilwyn and the 
FDIC, which is set for a court trial beginning July 11." Stilwyn Reply to Opposition, at 2. It 
argued that Anaconda/Portfolio had no factual support to assert that the FDIC had waived the 
8 Inclusion of this pleading in the record is subject to a pending Motion to Augment. 
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auction rules and that recently discovered documents did not create new evidence sufficient to 
alter the Court's order on summary judgment. 
The Court granted the FDIC's Motion to Enforce on May 29, 2011, and ordered that 
"Plaintiffs shall release the Portfolio Assignment within 5 business days of the date of this 
order." R., Vol. IV, p. 850 (Emphasis in original). 
13. Stilwyn Motion to Confirm Status as a Party to Slander of Title 
Counterclaim 
May 31, 2011, Stilwyn filed "Stilwyn, Inc.' s Motion to Confirm Status as a Party to 
Slander of Title Counterclaim" ("Motion to Confirm"). R., Vol. IV, p. 851-853. It also filed 
"Stilwyn Inc.' s Memorandum in Support of Motion to Confirm Status as a Party to Slander of 
Title Counterclaim" ("Memo to Confirm Status"). R., Vol. II, p. 324-329. The Motion to 
Confirm was supported by a "Declaration ofB. Newal Squyres." Declaration of B. Newal 
Squyres ("Squyres Dec."), Exhibits 1 to 4, supra note 1, May 31, 2011, ECF No. 58-2. 9 
Stilwyn's stated purpose in filing its Motion to Confirm was "to confirm its status as a 
party counterclaimant with respect to the pending counterclaim for slander of title and for all 
purposes of this litigation." R., Vol. IV, p. 851. Stilwyn summarized its participation in the 
Federal Case from the time it intervened as follows: 
Since its intervention, Stilwyn has filed briefs and supporting papers in opposition 
to Plaintiffs pre-trial motions, filed briefs in support of FDIC-R's motions, filed 
briefs and supporting papers in opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider the 
Court's summary judgment decision, and in support of the FDIC's motion to 
enforce. After the Court's summary judgment decision, Stilwyn has actively 
pursued its rights against Anaconda under the slander of title claim, including 
9 Inclusion of this pleading in the record is subject to a pending Motion to Augment. 
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participation in the status conference regarding that claim and setting a trial date, 
serving discovery requests, receiving discovery responses, noticing and taking 
depositions, all in preparation for the Court trial set for July 11, 2011. 
Id. at 852. 
In its Memorandum to Confirm Status, Stilwyn argued that since the Court's "Summary 
Judgment Decision, Stilwyn has taken the lead in actively pursuing the [FDIC's] counterclaim 
[for slander of title]." R., Vol. II, p. 325. It explained that after propounding written discovery, 
it "noticed and took the depositions of Robert Kantor, Richard Coleman, Anthony St. George, 
and David Wali, all of whom were directly involved in the events related to the slander of title 
claim." Id. To support its argument to confirm status, Stilwyn detailed in sixteen numbered 
paragraphs, the steps it had taken to assert "its right to establish liability and damages with 
respect to the slander of title claim ..... " Id. at 325-328. Additional evidence of its full 
participation in the slander of title claim, Stilwyn' s counsel submitted, in entirety, its written 
discovery and deposition notices. Squyres Dec., at 1-2; Ex. 1-4. 
Anaconda/Portfolio filed its opposition to Stilwyn's Motion to Confirm on June 8, 2011, 
Plaintiffs' Opposition to Stilwyn, Inc.' s Motion to Confirm Status as a Party to Slander of Title 
Counterclaim (Dkt. No. 58) ("Opposition to Confirm Status"). R., Vol. IV, p. 859-866. 
Plaintiffs argued in opposition that Stilwyn had never given Plaintiffs notice that "Stilwyn 
intended to take any action in [the] lawsuit other than simply defending against Plaintiffs' 
claims" and, as a result, Plaintiffs were "severely prejudiced" in their trial preparation. Id. at 
860. Stilwyn fully" ... recognized the existence of the FDIC's counterclaim, Stilwyn 
nevertheless chose for strategic or other reasons not to join in the FDIC's counterclaim or to 
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personally assert a counterclaim against the Plaintiffs." Id. at 861. Plaintiffs claimed that 
Stilwyn violated the Court's Case Management Order by failing to amend its Answer to plead a 
counterclaim for slander of title before the expiration of the January 14, 2011, deadline; that Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 15 does not permit verbal notice for amending claims; and, Stilwyn's damages for 
slander of title differed from the FDIC's damages. Id. at 862-865. Alternatively, Anaconda/ 
Portfolio requested that the trial be continued. Id. at 865. 
14. Stilwyn Withdrew Motion to Confirm Status to Pursue Remedies in 
"Another Forum" 
Stilwyn got caught. Several days later, June 13, 2011, Stilwyn filed its Notice of 
Withdrawal of Stilwyn, Inc. 's Motion to Confirm Status ("Withdrawal Notice"). R., Vol. IV, p. 
867-869. In its Withdrawal Notice, Stilwyn withdrew its Motion to Confim1 Status and declared 
that it 
... will pursue its remedies in another forum to avoid issues regarding its claims, 
the parties that are potentially liable for the damages it has incurred based on such 
claims, and its ability to collect such damages as may be awarded. 
Therefore, Stilwyn does not intend to participate further in this case related to the 
slander of title counterclaim but will continue to protect and defend its interests 
related to Plaintiffs' claims that were subject to this Court's Memorandum 
Decision and Order (Dkt. 41 ). 
Id. at 867-868. 
Stilwyn decided to just quit. Despite having fully participated in pursuing the slander of 
title claim, it abdicated any further responsibility for the tort claim it had so actively pursued. 
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Anaconda/Portfolio and the FDIC settled and dismissed the FD I C's slander of title claim. 
R., Vol. IV, pp. 882-885. The Court entered an Amended Judgment on June 28, 2011. Id. at 
889-890. 
15. Stilwyn Filed Blaine County Complaint 
Making good on its stated intent to "pursue its remedies in another forum," on September 
28, 2011, Stilwyn filed its Complaint in Blaine County, Idaho. R., Vol. I, p. 17-43. On March 
20, 2012, Stilwyn filed the operative Second Amended Complaint. Id. at 70-96. 
16. Idaho First Bank filed Motion for Summary Judgment 
March 11, 2013, IFB filed "Idaho First Bank's Motion for Summary Judgment" ("IFB 
MSJ")(R., Vol. II, p. 381-383), its "Memorandum in Support ofldaho First Bank's Motion for 
Summary Judgment" ("IFB Memo re MSJ")(/d. at 394-422), "Idaho First Bank's Statement of 
Undisputed Facts in Support of Motion of Motion for Summary Judgment" ("IFB SOF")(/d. at 
384-393) and "Affidavit of Daniel E. Williams Re: Idaho First Bank's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and I.R.E. 201 Motion" ("Williams Aff.") with Exhibits A through V attached. R., 
Vol. I, p. 141-261; R., Vol. II, p. 262-370. Exhibits A through S were selected copies of various 
pleadings and other filings from the Federal Case. The District Court was well-apprised of the 
procedural posture of the Federal Case. 
Idaho First's summary judgment motion to dismiss Stilwyn's claims was based on three 
broad arguments: (1) Stilwyn's claims were barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion (R., Vol. 
II, p. 396-409); (2) Stilwyn failed to plead Fed.R.Civ.P. 13(a) compulsory counterclaims in the 
Federal Case and therefore lost the right to bring them in the state case (Id. at 409-41 O); and, (3) 
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Stilwyn could not prove facts to support prima facie cases against IFB for slander of title, 
intentional interference with prospective advantage, abuse of process, defamation, "acting in 
concert," spoliation, and/or estoppel (Id. at 410-420). 
To support IFB's argument that Stilwyn's claims against IFB were barred by the doctrine 
ofres judicata, IFB proved all elements of that doctrine; same pai1ies, same claims and final 
judgment as required by the Idaho Supreme Court in Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 
157 P.3d 613 (2007). R., Vol. II, p. 398-407. IFB demonstrated that because of the corporate/ 
entity interrelatedness of the named defendants in both the Federal Case and the state case, the 
parties were the same or in privity with each other. Id. at 398-401. Stilwyn's claims in the 
Federal Case and the state case were the same, IFB argued, because they arose out of the same 
operative transactional facts and Stilwyn, in both cases was attempting to preserve its property 
rights and economic survival. Id. at 401-405. Finally, IFB proved the third and final prong of 
the claim preclusion doctrine - the Federal Court entered a final judgment in the Federal Case 
dismissing all claims with prejudice. Id. at 405-407. 
17. Idaho First Bank's Motion for Summary Judgment Granted - Stilwyn's 
Claims Dismissed 
July 23, 2013, Judge Brody filed his "Memorandum Decision Granting Defendants 
Motion of Summary Judgment" ("MSJ Decision"). R., Vol. V, p. 1091-1102. The District Court 
held that Stilwyn's claims were barred by resjudicata, specifically claim preclusion because 
" ... the claims should have been brought in the Federal Case where Stilwyn voluntarily subjected 
itself to the jurisdictional powers of the U.S. District Court for the District ofidaho as an 
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intervener, could have asserted the counterclaim, and did attempt to join the counterclaim with 
the FDIC." Id. at 1095. The Court followed Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 ldahol 19, 123, 157 
P.3d 613,617 (2007) and applied the three-prong test for application of the resjudicata doctrine; 
same parties, same claims and final judgment. R., Vol. V, p. 1095-1101. The Court found "no 
genuine issue as to any material fact exists and Stilwyn meets those requirements, requiring 
dismissal of the complaint." Id. at 1096. The Court, in its analysis first found that Stilwyn was a 
party to the case due to its Motion to Intervene. Id. at 1096-1097; see also R., Vol. III, p. 673-
676; R., Vol. III, p. 725-734. Stilwyn is a party since it is a "party as of right" in the Federal 
Case. R., Vol. V, p. 1097. The District Court held that the parties in the Federal Case are the 
same as the District Court case. Id. The link was Robert Kantor and Michael Page, as Stilwyn 
alleged in its Second Amended Complaint. Id. 
Second, the District Court found that the same claims were at issue in the Federal Case. 
Id. at 1098-1099. Relying on this Court's decision in Ticor, claim preclusion bars 
" ... adjudication not only on the matters offered and received to defeat the claim, but also as to 
'every other matter which might and should have been litigated in the first suit."' Id. at 1098 
( citations omitted). Contrary to Stilwyn' s argument, the District Court had a basis for 
determining the "same claims" are at issue. The District Court relied on this Court's broad 
"transactional concept" defining a "claim" for claim preclusion. Id. Stilwyn merely cites to 
Rule 13(a) and its argument there was no claim against it to compel a counterclaim to defeat this 
conclusion. App. Br.14-15. However, the District Court already determined that Stilwyn was a 
party due to its motion to intervene. R., Vol.V, p. 1096-1097. Along with the memorandum in 
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support motion to intervene, Stilwyn filed an Answer in which it became an opposing party, a 
defendant. R., Vol. III, p. 677-685, 774-782. The District Court properly moved forward with 
its res judicata analysis by applying the broad transactional rule for claim preclusion to determine 
that the same claims are at issue. R., Vol. V, p.1098-1099. Even though S tilywn still attempts to 
characterize the Federal Case as a mere "declaratory judgment," the District Court held that: 
It started that way in state court, but after removal to federal court, the FDIC filed 
a counterclaim. There was nothing about the suit to prevent Plaintiff from 
litigating its claims. The action in federal court was not merely a declaratory 
judgment or attachment case .... [Stilwyn] had the same opportunity to bring 
claims as other parties. 
Id. at 1099. 
Third, the District Court held that "Stilwyn argues that there was no final judgment, that 
they were a part of, in the Federal Case. However, the facts show otherwise." Id. at 1100. A 
final judgment was entered in the Federal Case. Id. The Memorandum Decision and Order as 
well as the stipulation for dismissal of the slander claim were " ... final judgments on the merits 
which decided all issues brought or that could have been brought based on the facts arising out 
the Stilwyn Loan/FDIC transaction." Id. The District Court further held there were no material 
issues of fact since Stilwyn was a party to the case and the judgment is final. Id. Stilwyn still 
argues the Amended Judgment is "not effective" against it. App.Br. 36. Stilwyn focuses its 
argument on a limited view of its party status rather than the District Court's application of the 
rule in Ticor defining a final judgment expansively as " ... the former adjudication concludes 
parties and privies not only as to every matter offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim 
but also as to every matter which might and should have been litigated in the first suit." R., 
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Vol.V, p. 1100; see also App.Br. 33-37. The District Court held then, that the "final judgment" 
broadly includes claims that could have been brought based on the Stilwyn loan. R., Vol.V, p. 
1100. Stilwyn does not dispute this definition of the "final judgment" but merely continues its 
claim, as has been the focus of its brief, that it was not a "party" to which the Federal Case 
Amended Judgment applies. App. Br. 34 (However, the District Court's conclusion may be true 
for Anaconda/Portfolio and the FDIC). Stilwyn cannot select and choose when it is a "party" 
once it was granted intervenor-defendant status. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court did not err as a matter of law in its interpretation, 
construction, and application of the doctrine of res judicata (claim preclusion) 
and its conclusion that Stilwyn's claims were barred by reason of Stilwyn's 
involvement in the Federal Case 
1. There arc no facts in dispute 
The District Court found "no genuine issue as to any material fact exist[ ed]" and, as a 
matter of law Stilwyn's claims were barred. R., Vol. V, P. 1096. Stilwyn acquiesces in this 
assessment in its Appellate Brief, because nowhere in it does Stilwyn make any factual 
argument. The District Court and IFB, refer solely to the record made in the Federal Case for the 
factual basis for the legal arguments that Stilwyn was required to file compulsory counterclaims 
in that action and, failing to do so, are now barred by the doctrine of res judicata from bringing 
those claims in state court. Southern Constr. Co. v. United States ex rel. Pickard, 371 U.S. 57, 60 
( 1962) ("The requirement that counterclaims arising out of the same transaction or occurrence as 
the opposing party's claim "shall" be stated in the pleadings was designed to prevent multiplicity 
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of actions and to achieve resolution in a single lawsuit of all disputes arising out of common 
matters.") 
2. Stihvyn is a "Party" to the Federal Case, Without Limitation, Due to it 
Being an Intervenor as a Matter of Right under Fed Rule 24(a)(2) 
As an intervenor Stilwyn was a "party" to the Federal Case. An intervenor is treated 
similarly as any other party. United States, et al. v. Board of Education of Waterbury, Conn., 
605 F.2d 573, 576 (2nd Circ. 1979)("An intervenor is certainly a party." ( citations omitted)); 
Columbus-America Discovery Group, et al. v. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company, et al., 974 
F.2d 450,469 (4th Cir. 1992)("In general, intervenors of right 'assume the status of full 
participants in a lawsuit and are normally treated as if they were original parties once 
intervention is granted."') In the Federal Case, the Court granted Stilwyn status as an intervenor, 
as a matter of right, with no limitation except to set filing deadlines for Stilwyn to submit its 
pleadings. 
3. Stilwyn fully participated as a "Party" in the Federal Case 
Further, Stilwyn actively participated as a "party" to the federal proceeding. It moved to 
intervene; it filed an Answer to Complaint for Declaratory Judgment; and, it fully participated in 
discovery filing written discovery and taking depositions. Stilwyn moved "to confirm its status 
as a party counterclaimant with respect to the pending counterclaim for slander of title and for all 
purposes of this litigation." The chronology of Stihvyn's participation in the Federal Case 
demonstrates Stilwyn was an active player in the former litigation. The conduct indicates an 
aggressive litigant. 
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4. IFB has fulfilled its burden of proving the requirements to bar an action 
based on claim preclusion: the parties are the same, the claims are the 
same, and there was a final judgment 
The requirements for claim preclusion to bar a subsequent action are: (1) same parties; 
(2) same claim; and (3) final judgment. Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 124, 157 P.3d 
613, 618 (2007) ( citations omitted). IFB proved each of those elements in its motion for 
summary judgment. The District Court agreed. R., Vol. V, p. 1096-1101. 
5. The parties were the same 
IFB argued and the Court agreed that, although Stilwyn tried to differentiate between the 
parties to the Federal Case and those named in Stilwyn's Second Amended Complaint, the non-
IFB parties were "significantly related to and intertwined" with Anaconda/Portfolio so as to be 
the same parties in each case. Id. At 1097. The District Court found "there were no material 
issues of fact as to whether the Federal Case and the state action have the same parties." Id. 
6. The claims were the same 
IFB extensively presented the operative facts involved in the Federal Case and the 
subsequent procedural process of that case, arguing that the facts raised in Stilwyn's state case 
arose from the same transactional basis. Stilwyn never directly addressed the "same claim" 
argument. Instead it repeatedly argued since no claims were made against it, it was not required 
to make any claims. Id. At 472-273. The District Court agreed with IFB that the claims in the 
two actions were the same. Since Stilwyn never directly addressed the same claim argument, the 
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Court dispensed with Stilwyn's argument that it was not required to make any claims. It found 
that 
Plaintiff has two main arguments. One is that because there were no claims 
against it, it did not have to file its claims as counterclaims. This analysis 
contradicts the language of the rule and is not consistent with case law suggesting 
that counterclaims need not be raised in certain actions. The Federal Case was not 
merely a declaratory judgment or attachment case. It started that way in state 
court, but after removal to federal court, the FDIC filed a counterclaim. There was 
nothing about the suit to prevent Plaintiff from litigating its claims. The federal 
court action was not merely a declaratory judgment case, Stilwyn entered the case 
as a party as a matter ofright. It had the same opportunity to bring claims as the 
other parties. This is demonstrated by Stilwyn' s statements "confirming" its status 
as a count-claimant joining the FDIC;s counterclaim. Stilwyn nevertheless argues 
it never had its day in court or final judgment on the claims. 
Reviewing the filings in the federal case, Stilwyn faild to assert the counterclaim 
until late in the litigation. The opposition to allowing Stilwyn to join the FDIC's 
counterclaim focused on the timeliness of raising the issue. Stilwyn then withdrew 
the motion. The motion to join or confirm status in the FDIC was never denied. 
After intervening, Stilwyn cannot simply pick and choose where and when to file 
its claims. It chose to join the Federal Case, it assumed it had the ability to assert 
the claim, it saw there was opposition and apparently tried to maneuver past the 
opposition. The claim had to be raised there and then. It is even possible the court 
would have allowed Stilwyn to pursue the counterclaim despite its untimeliness 
under the scheduling order. Clearly the Federal Disctrict Court could get 
jurisdiction over all paiiies and resolve all the claims. Stilwyn chose to join the 
fray in the Federal Court and must live with the consequences. 
R., Vol. V, p. 1098 99. 
As a result of Stilwyn's failure to contest the same claims argument, the District Court 
determined all claim should have been brought in the Federal Case. 
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7. Final Judgment 
In the Federal Case, both sides, the FDIC and Anaconda/Po1ifolio, moved for summary 
judgment. Anaconda/Portfolio asked the court to rule that the rights in the Stilwyn Loan were 
transferred from IFB to Anaconda when IFB and the FDIC entered into the Loan Sale 
Agreement. Stilwynjoined the FDIC in asking the Federal Court to direct Anaconda and 
Portfolio to release the Assignment and Lis Pendens. The Federal Court ruled that IFB never 
obtained an interest in the Stilwyn Loan. As an assignor of IFB's rights in the Stilwyn loan, 
Anaconda had no interest in the Stilwyn Loan and that the same was true for Portfolio. R., Vol. 
IV, p. 798. The Court denied Anaconda's and Portfolio's Motion. The Court granted the 
FDIC/Stilwyn Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
There was one remaining claim after the Court's Memorandum Decision and Order. The 
FDIC had filed a counterclaim for slander of title against Anaconda and Portfolio not resolved by 
summary judgment. Earlier, Stilwyn had moved to confirm its status as a party to the FDIC's 
slander of title counterclaim. Id. At 851-53. Anaconda opposed the motion on the grounds, 
inter alia, that Stilwyn had failed to plead that cause of action when it filed its Answer and that 
the Motion was not timely, Stilwyn withdrew its Motion to Confirm Status. After the Court's 
Memorandum Decision and Order, Anaconda, Portfolio and the FDIC stipulated to a dismissal 
with prejudice of the remaining claim for slander of title. On June 28, 2011, the Court entered a 
Judgment (Id. At 888) and Amended Judgment (Id. At 889-890). The Amended Judgment 
incorporated the slander of title stipulation that all claims, including slander of title, were 
dismissed with prejudice. 
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The Judgment and Amended Judgment in the Federal Case were final judgments on the 
merits which decided all issues that were brought and/or could have been brought based on the 
facts arising out of the Stilwyn Loan/FDIC transaction. The District Court found that "there was 
a final judgment in the Federal Case." R. Vol. V, p. 1100. All elements of claim preclusion 
have been met. 
8. This Court should not adopt the Declaratory Judgment Exception to Res 
Judicata 
Since the Federal Case did not begin and end simply as a declaratory judgment action, as 
Stilwyn has argued, application of 1 Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 33 (1982), would not 
resuscitate Stilwyn's claims. The cases cited by Stilwyn do not support its argument that the 
declaratory judgment exception should apply. Instead the case law cited substantiates the 
exception to the exception that if a declaratory judgment claim is filed with other requests for 
relief, the exception does not apply. Thus, there is no basis for this Court to adopt Restatement 
33 exception to res judicata in this particular appeal, and the District Court did not err in failing 
to do so. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
As this Court recently summarized in Venable v. Internet Auto Rent & Sales, Inc., 
Idaho_, 329 P.3d 356 (2014), the standard for appellate review ofan order granting summary 
judgment 
... is the same as the standard used by the district court in ruling on a motion for 
summary judgment." Thomas v. 1\;fedical Center Physicians, P.A., 138 Idaho 200, 
205, 61 P.3d 557, 562 (2002). "All disputed facts are to be construed liberally in 
favor of the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn 
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from the record are to be drawn in favor of the non-moving party." Oats v. Nissan 
Motor Corp. in U.S.A., 126 Idaho 162,164,879 P.2d 1095, 1097 (1994). 
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions 
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as 
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter 
oflaw." I.R.C.P. 56(c). The Court exercises free review over questions of law. 
Rhoades v. State, 149 Idaho 130,132,233 P.3d 61, 63 (2010). 
The application of claim preclusion is a question of law over which this Court exercises 
free review. Kawai Farms v. Longstreet, 121 Idaho 610,613,826 P.2d. 1322, 1325 (1992) and 
Berkshire lnvs., LLC v. Taylor, 153 Idaho 73, 80,278 P.3d 943,950 ( 2012) (" Whether an 
action is bmred by res judicata is a question oflaw.") 
ARGUMENT 
A. Stilwyn was not a "Limited" Intervenor in the Federal Case 
Stilwyn in its Appellate Brief attempts to downplay its role as an intervenor in the 
Federal Case. App.Br. 4 ("Stilwyn sought leave to intervene to file briefing in support of the 
FDIC's opposition to the Anaconda/Portfolio motion." "Given the limited nature of its 
intervention ... "). When Stilwyn moved to intervene in the Federal Case it did not move under 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 to enter the case in any "limited" capacity, it moved "for leave to intervene as 
party defendant ... as a matter of right pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2)." R., Vol. III, p. 673. 
Once Stilwyn's motion to intervene was granted, it became a full-fledged "party" to the Federal 
Case. Id. at 725-734. In United States v. Oregon, 675 F.2d. 1009, 1014 (9th Cir. 1981), the 
Ninth Circuit characterized the status of intervenors as follows: 
Intervenors under Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a)(2), such as the Yakima Tribe, enter the suit 
with the status of original parties and are fully bound by all future court orders. 
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Marcaida v. Rascoe, 569 F.2d 828, 831 (5th Cir. 1978); 7 AC. Wright & A. 
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1920 (1972); 3B lvfoore 's Federal 
Practice P 24.16(6), at 24-671 to 24-673 (2d ed. 1981). By successfully 
intervening, a party "makes himself vulnerable to complete adjudication by the 
federal court of the issues in litigation between the intervener and the adverse 
party. 
Id. at 24-671. See also, Schneider v. Dumbarton Developers, Inc., 767 F.2d 1007, 1017 (D.C. 
Cir. 1985) ("When a party intervenes, it becomes a full participant in the lawsuit and is treated 
just as if it were an original party.") (Citations omitted.); and 7C Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal 
Practice and Procedure § 1901, at 257 (3d ed. 2007) (the purpose of intervention under Rule 24 
is for the intervenor to "come in as a party" in its own right, not to support one side or another.) 
Below, the District Court had no difficulty dispensing with Stilwyn's insistence it was not 
a party in the Federal Case: 
Here, the Plaintiff argues that he was not a party in the Federal Case. However, 
Stilwyn filed a Motion to Intervene as a Defendant in the Federal Case, which 
was granted. Memo. Decision and Order on Mot. to Intervene. While a party to 
the Federal Case, Stilwyn complained that Anaconda and Portfolio, other parties 
in the Federal Case against the FDIC, were wrongly claiming an interest in the 
Stilwyn Loan. Mot. to Intervene at 2. Stilwyn claimed that they were a party of 
right in the Federal Case, and the Court so ruled. Stilwyn was a party of right in 
the federal case. By entering into the Federal Case, Stilwyn was a party for 
purposes of res judicata. 
R., Vol. V, p. 1096-1097. 
Not only did Stilwyn become a "party of right" through the federal court decisions, as 
found by the District Court, but Stilwyn, by its own acknowledgement, took the lead in pursuing 
the slander of title claim. It represented to the Court in its Motion to Confinn Status as a Party to 
Slander of Title Counterclaim, that it "ha[ d] actively pursued its rights against Anaconda under 
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the slander of title claim, including participation in the status conference regarding that claim and 
setting a trial date, serving discovery requests, receiving discovery responses, noticing and taking 
depositions, all in preparation for the Court trial set for July 11, 2011." R., Vol. IV, p. 852. 
To continue to argue that its intervention in the Federal Case was "limited" is, at best, a 
mischaracterization of the level of its participation in pursuing the slander of title claim. 
Stilwyn's flurry of activity in the Federal Case to prove the slander of title claim against 
Anaconda/Portfolio and to seek damages on its own behalf, damages it claims were distinct from 
the damages the FDIC was seeking completely negate any argument that Stilwyn's participation 
was limited. The only basis for such a characterization might be that it ceased its activities after 
Anaconda/Portfolio challenged its participation in the trial of the slander of title action because 
Stilwyn had failed to timely plead a counterclaim on its own behalf and was trying to "piggy 
back" onto the FDIC's counterclaim. R., Vol. V, p. 1094. 
B. The District Court Correctly Ruled that Res .Judicata barred Stilwyn's claims in 
State Court 
1. Stilwyn's slander of title and other tort claims were compulsory 
counterclaims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a) and Stilwyn was required to file 
them when it filed its Answer 
In its "Summary of Argument on Appeal" and throughout the remainder of its Brief, 
Stilwyn repeats the refrain "[b ]ecause no claims were made against it by Anaconda/Portfolio, 
there was no 'opposing party' with a claim against Stilwyn that it was required to counter by the 
compulsory counterclaim provisions of Rule 13(a)." App.Br. 9, 10, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20, 24, 26 
and 38. The District Court ruled otherwise. 
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This analysis contradicts the language of the rule [13(a)] and is not consistent 
with the case law suggesting that counterclaims need not be raised in certain 
actions. The Federal Case was not merely a declaratory judgment or attachment 
case. It started that way in state court, but after removal to federal court, the FDIC 
filed a counterclaim. There was nothing about the suit to prevent Plaintiff 
[Appellant] from litigating its claims. The action in federal court was not merely a 
declaratory judgment or attachment case. Stilwyn entered the case as a party of 
right. It had the same opportunity to bring claims as the other parties. This is 
demonstrated by Stilwyn's statements "confirming" its status as a counter-
claimant joining in the FDIC's counterclaim." 
R., Vol. V, p. 1099. 
Stilwyn argues that "[t]he district court failed to appreciate the relationship and 
authoritative significance ofldaho Rule of Civil Procedure 13(a) to the application of res 
judicata." App.Br. 9. It is readily apparent from the Court's analysis quoted above, that the Court 
completely and fully understood the relationship between Rule 13( a) and res judicata. 
2. Stilwyn's continuous argument that there were no claims against it so it is 
not required to assert a counterclaim is still to no avail. 
Stilwyn's persistent argument that since no claims were made against it, it was not 
required to plead any counterclaim is contrary to the general rules of federal and state courts. 
W.R. Habeeb, Annotation, Failure to Assert Matter as Counterclaim as Precluding Assertion 
Thereof in Subsequent Action, Under Federal Rules or Similar State Rules or Statutes, 22 
A.L.R.2d. 621 ( 1952). The sh01i answer to Stilwyn' s first issue on appeal "Did the district court 
commit reversible error as a matter of law in its interpretation, construction, and application of 
I.R.C.P. 13(a), and its conclusion that Stilwyn was required to assert compulsory counterclaims 
and third-party claims in the Federal Case?" is no. The District Court correctly ruled. 
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Idaho Rule 13(a) and Federal Rule 13(a) are virtually identical. 10 They both mandate 
filing a counterclaim arising out of the "transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the 
opposing party's claim." Stilwyn's arguments address no aspect of the transaction or occurrence 
requirement, but, extensively argues that Anaconda/P011folio "were not an 'opposing par1y' who 
had first made claims against Stilwyn." App.Br. 20. To evade discussing the "arising out of the 
transaction or occurrence" rule l 3(a) requirement for filing compulsory counterclaims is to 
ignore the fundamental policies behind "the compulsory counterclaim rule of achieving 
economy, fairness, and consistency by requiring both to be determined in a single suit." 3 James 
10 Compare: I.C.R.P. 13(a). Compulsory counterclaims. 
A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time of serving the pleading the 
pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the 
subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence 
of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. But the pleader need not state the 
claim if (I) at the time the action was commenced the claim was the subject of another pending 
action, or (2) the opposing party brought suit upon the claim by attachment or other process by 
which the court did not acquire jurisdiction to render a personal judgment on that claim, and the 
pleader is not stating any counterclaim under this Rule 13. 
With: Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a). Counterclaim and Crossclaim 
(a) Compulsory Counterclaim. 
(1) In General. A pleading must state as a counterclaim any claim that--at the time of its 
service--the pleader has against an opposing party if the claim: 
(A) arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing 
party's claim; and 
(B) does not require adding another party over whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. 
(2) Exceptions. The pleader need not state the claim if: 
(A) when the action was commenced, the claim was the subject of another pending action; or 
(B) the opposing party sued on its claim by attachment or other process that did not establish 
personal jurisdiction over the pleader on that claim, and the pleader does not assert any 
counterclaim under this rule. 
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Wm. Moore, et aL Moore's Federal Practice § 13 .10 (3d ed. 2010). By adopting the there-was-
no-opposing-party argument, Stilwyn cannot dodge IFB's original argument that the Federal 
Case and the state case arose out of the same transaction. R., Vol. II, p. 401-405. IFB' s 
argument was adopted by the District Court: 
The extent to which "claims" or "matter" are barred in later litigation has also 
been addressed by the Idaho Supreme Court. In Ticor, they state that"[ c ]!aim 
preclusion bars adjudication not only on the matters offered and received to defeat 
the claim, but also as to 'every matter which might and should have been litigated 
in the first suit."' The Idaho Supreme Court further stated that the "transactional 
concept of a claim is broad" and that claim preclusion 'may apply even where 
there is not a substantial overlap between the theories advanced in support of a 
claim, or in the evidence relating to those theories. 
R., Vol. V, p. 1098 (Citations and internal quotations omitted). 
The District Court found that "the fact that Plaintiff never actually litigated its claims is 
irrelevant. The question of claim preclusion turns on whether the claims could have and should 
have been raised." Id. 
3. Stilwyn's reliance on Joseph v. Darrar, Kootenai Elec. Co-op, Inc. v. Lamar 
Corp and Noel v. Hall is misplaced. 
Stilwyn relies on Joseph v. Darrar, 93 Idaho 762, 472 P.2d 328 (1970) as authority for 
the rule that "res judicata does not apply to the litigation of counterclaims and only actions 
properly classified as Rule 13(a) counterclaims are barred by a failure to raise them in an earlier 
action." App.Br. 9 & 20. Joseph, however, is of no assistance to Stilwyn. IFB argued and the 
District Court found that the claims Stilwyn had, could have and should have raised in the 
Federal Case were compulsory counterclaims. Joseph provides full support for that argument. It 
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held that Rule 13(a) counterclaims were "'mandatory"' and were required '"to be pleaded and 
adjudicated or else all right of action is foreclosed."' Joseph 93 Idaho at 765, 4 72 P .2d at 331. 
But, at issue in Joseph was whether Rule 13(b ), permissive counterclaims, were barred by a 
party's failure to raise them. The Supreme Court held: 
It is our opinion that the res judicata principle is inapplicable to the litigation of 
counterclaims. An action on a claim which was a permissive counterclaim in an 
earlier action, but which was not raised and litigated in that action, is not barred 
even though it might have been submitted and litigated in the earlier action. Only 
actions on claims properly classified in an earlier action as compulsory 
counterclaims under I.R.C.P. 13(a) are barred by a failure to raise them in the 
earlier action, and this is a bar arising not from the concept of res j udicata, but 
from I.R.C.P. 13(a) itself. It is then, only compulsory counterclaims which are 
barred either by a failure to raise them in the earlier action or by a decision on the 
claim in the earlier action. An action on a claim which was the subject of a 
permissive counterclaim in an earlier action is not barred by a failure to raise it in 
the earlier action, but is only barred by a decision on the claim in the prior action. 
Id. at 93 Idaho 766, 472 P.2d at 332. Joseph simply provides no authority or support for 
Stilwyn 's argument. 
Similarly, Stilwyn relies on the dissenting opinion in Kootenai Elec. Co-op, Inc. v. Lamar 
Corp., 148 Idaho 116,219 P.2d 440 (2009) to support its argument that since Stilwyn "did not 
seek relief in the Federal Case and Anaconda/Portfolio sought no affirmative relief against 
Stilwyn," Stilwyn was not required to file a compulsory counterclaim. App.Br. 24. Kootenai is of 
little value to Stilwyn. That case addressed the "interplay between Idaho R. Civ. P. 13(g) 
[permissive cross-claims] and the doctrine of res judicata." The majority agreed with the lower 
court's analysis and found that"[ a] party need not bring a cross-claim that is permissive in nature 
but when the party brings and pursues such a claim to a conclusion, res judicata applies." Id. 148 
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Idaho at 122,219 P.2d at 446. Kootenai did not deal with compulsory counterclaims. Referring 
to the majority opinion, Stilwyn presents the following non sequitur: "These facts and analysis 
[from Kootenai] lend no support to the district court's decision here.'' App.Br. 23. The District 
Court did not rely in any way on Kootenai, or even cite it. 
Stilwyn does, however, rely on the dissent in Kootenai as "persuasive authority under the 
facts here for reversal." Id. The dissent first noted that the claims at issue in the prior lawsuit 
were between two defendants, KEC and Lamar, and therefore, would have been permissive 
cross-claims under I.R.C.P. 13(g). Kootenai, 148 Idaho at 123,219 P.3d at 447. The dissent 
reasoned that since the cross claim was a separate cause of action based on a statutory right to 
indemnification it was a separate cause of action and clearly a permissive cross-claim. On that 
basis, in the dissent' s opinion, it was not barred by res judicata. Id. A close reading of the 
dissenting opinion in Kootenai does not lead to any conclusion that it is "persuasive authority" 
for Stilwyn's proposition that since neither Stilwyn nor Anaconda/Portfolio sought affirmative 
relief in the Federal Case, Stilwyn was not required to file compulsory Rule l 3(a) counterclaims. 
Stilwyn challenges the District Court's dismissal of its case on the grounds that "Stilwyn 
could have or should have brought claims against non-parties (IFB and the Rokan/Page 
Defendants) in the Federal Case .... " Circuitously, Stilwyn argues "[t]here is no Idaho Rule of 
Civil Procedure or binding authority for the proposition that a 'non-party' to a prior suit qualifies 
as an 'opposing party' within the meaning of Rule l 3(a)." App.Br. 26. This argument ignores 
the District Court's discussion and ruling under the "l. Same Parties" analysis of the 
Memorandum Decision. R., Vol. V, p. 1096-1097. There the District Court found, inter alia, 
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that Stilwyn was a party to the Federal Case; the non-Idaho First Defendants were "significantly 
related and intertwined with the two plaintiffs in the Federal Case - Anaconda and Portfolio"; 
and, that IFB was in privity with Anaconda." Id 
Notwithstanding the District Court's ruling, Stilwyn attempted to stretch a factually 
distinguishable and procedurally convoluted Ninth Circuit case, Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148 (9th 
Cir. 2003), into blanket authority for its "non-party/opposing party" argument. In Noel, the Ninth 
Circuit used Washington State's claim preclusion rules to determine whether certain claims 
should have been brought in several different prior state cases and were therefore precluded as 
unasserted claims in federal court. The state cases involved a variety of parties in various 
combinations. In one of the cases, a party had not been a plaintiff and "thus was not an opposing 
party .... " Id at 1171. In applying Washington's Rule 13(a) requirements, the Ninth Circuit was 
careful to note that "[t]he Washington courts have adopted a strict reading of Rule 13(a)'s 
requirement that a pleader must bring compulsory counterclaims against 'any opposing party.'" 
Id There is no authority that Idaho has followed Washington's or any other jurisdictions' "strict 
reading requirement." Noel has no application to this case. 
4. Pursuant to Ruic 19, Stilwyn was required to join other parties to the 
Federal Case. 
In addition, Stilwyn's argument that it was not required to bring others into the Federal 
Case, fails to account for the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 19, Required Joinder of Parties and 
I.R.C.P. Rule 19( a)( 1 ), Persons to be joined if feasible. The parties which the District Court 
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found Stilwyn could have or should have been joined were available under either Rule 19. All 
parties were subject to the federal court jurisdiction and could have been made parties. 
C. Adoption of the Declaratory Judgment Exception to Res Judicata would not 
Alter the Result in this Case. 
Stilwyn claims that, should this Court adopt Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 33, the 
foregoing analysis would change. Although the FDIC asserted a counterclaim for slander of 
title, which was resolved by the U.S. District Court by a dismissal with prejudice, Stilwyn 
continues to proclaim that "[t]he Federal Case started and ended as a declaratory judgment 
action." App. Br. 28. Yet, regardless of Stilwyn's proclamation, the plain language of the 
Restatement contradicts Stilwyn, as does the very case authority Stilwyn cites to this Court. 
According to the Restatement, a final judgment in a declaratory judgment action is 
"conclusive in a subsequent action between them as to matters declared," as well as "any issues 
actually litigated by them and determined in this action." 1 Restatement (Second) Judgments§ 
33 (1982) ( emphasis added). The slander of title counterclaim was litigated and determined in 
the Federal Action. It was not "voluntarily dismissed" by the parties merely without prejudice. 
Instead, pursuant to stipulation, it was dismissed with prejudice by Judgment entered by the U.S. 
District Court. Such a dismissal with prejudice is the equivalent of a final judgment on the 
merits. See, e.g., Stewart, et al. v. US. Bancorp, 297 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Circ. 2002), citing, 
Paganis v. Blonstein, 3 F.3d 1067, 1071 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting that "with prejudice" is an 
acceptable shorthand for "adjudication on the merits"); Classic Auto Refinishing, Inc. v. Marino 
(In re Marino), 181 F .3d 114 2, 1144 (9th Cir. 1999); 9 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, 
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Federal Practice and Procedure § 23 73 ( 1973 ). Accordingly, the Federal Case did not start and 
end as merely a declaratory judgment action, so application of the Restatement would not save 
Stilwyn's claims. 
The very first case cited by Stilwyn in support of its Restatement argument likewise 
provides it with no support. Stilwyn cites this Court to Duane Read, Inc., v. St. Paul Fire & 
Marine Ins. Co., 600 F.3d 190, 196 (2nd Cir. 2010) for the general proposition that the preclusive 
effect of a declaratory judgment action applies only to matters declared and to issues litigated 
and determined, citing the Restatement. App. Br. 28. What Stilwyn leaves out is that the Second 
Circuit also explained: 
the declaratory judgment exception to the application of the doctrine of res 
judicata applies when "the prior action involved only a request for declaratory 
relief." Harborside [Refi"igerated Servs., Inc. v. Vogel], 959 F.2d at 372. See 
also Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice 
and Procedure § 4446, at 313-14 ('So long as the request for declaratory relief is 
combined or followed with coercive relief, the claim-preclusion rules that apply to 
actions for coercive relief apply with full force.'). 
600 F.3d at 196 ( emphasis in original). Applying this principle, the Second Circuit found: 
Id. 
Duane Reade argues that its claims come within the declaratory judgment 
exception because the prior action was limited to a request for declaratory relief. 
We disagree. In its initial action, Duane Reade brought two claims for 
declaratory relief and two claims for breach of contract (which were later 
dismissed without prejudice). St. Paul, in response, counterclaimed with its own 
breach of contract claims, which the district court dismissed with prejudice. At 
that point, the dispute was no longer only a request for declaratory relief. 
Then applying Rule 13, the Second Circuit found that once counterclaims were "raised," 
the parties were then obligated to bring all the claims they had arising from the same transaction: 
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When St. Paul raised its counterclaims, Duane Reade was compelled by Rule 13 
to file its own claims arising out of the same transaction or occmTence or else be 
precluded from pursuing those claims in a subsequent lawsuit. See Critical-Vac 
Filtration Corp. v. Minuteman Int'/, Inc., 233 F.3d 697, 699 (2d Cir. 2000) ("If a 
party has a compulsory counterclaim and fails to plead it, the claim cannot be 
raised in a subsequent lawsuit."). The declaratory judgment exception does not 
provide a safe haven from Rule I 3. 
600 F.3d at 197. Finally, apropos of Stilwyn's dilemma in the current case, the Second Circuit 
stated: "Where a litigant "selected a litigation strategy he now regrets, placing all his eggs in [ a 
single] basket[,] ... his choice of that strategy will not prevent the application of [preclusion 
against him]." 600 F.3d at 199, quoting, In re Southeast Banking Corp., 69 F.3d 1539, 1553 
(11th Cir. 1995) (inserts in original). 
Similarly, the further case authority Stilwyn cites contains the same caveat to the 
declaratory judgment exception to res judicata. See, Allan Block Corp. v. County Materials 
Corp., 512 F.3d 912, 917 (7th Cir. 2008) ( there is "an exception to the exception: a plaintiff who 
joins his request for a declaratory judgment with a request for an injunction or damages cannot 
avoid the bar of res judicata should he later seek additional such relief') ( citation omitted); 
Harborside Refrigerated Services, Inc. v. Vogel, supra, 959 F.2d 368, 373 (2d Cir. 1992) ("Many 
jurisdictions recognize an exception to ordinary res judicata principles where, as here, the prior 
action involved only a request for declaratory relief') ( emphasis added); Cimasi v. Fenton, 838 
F.2d 298, 299 (8th Cir. 1988) ("where a party seeks declaratory relief as well as affirmative relief 
through a coercive remedy, the exception under [the declaratory judgment exception to res 
judicata] does not apply"); Horn & Hardart Co. v. National Rail Passenger Corp., 843 F.2d 
546, 549 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("Where a party asks only for declaratory reliet: courts have limited 
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the preclusive effect to the matters declared ... ") (emphasis added); Mandarino v. Pollard, 718 
F.2d 845, 848 (7th Cir. Ill. 1983) ("Assuming, arguendo, that some controlling authority existed 
for application of the declaratory judgment exception in this circuit, Mandarino's reliance on that 
exception would still not aid him in this appeal. As stated in Restatement (Second) of Judgments 
§ 33, comment c, the purpose of declaratory actions is to supplement other types of litigation by 
providing 'a remedy that is simpler and less harsh than coercive relief.' According to the 
Restatement, this purpose is furthered when a plaintiff who has sought 'solely' declaratory relief 
is later permitted to seek additional, coercive relief based on the same claim. Under this 
rationale, permitting Mandarino to proceed with his federal lawsuit would not further the purpose 
of declaratory actions, since his state court action did not seek 'solely' declaratory relief'). 
Finally, Stilwyn cites to the canvass of other jurisdictions set forth in Andrew Robinson 
Int'!, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 547 F.3d 48, 57 (1st Cir. 2008) (considering Massachusetts 
law). In its discussion, however, the First Circuit again noted that the declaratory judgment 
exception to res judicata is limited to situations where the original claim is limited solely to 
declaratory relief: 
We also have examined the leading treatises. In general, they subscribe to the 
view that declaratory judgments should be accorded less preclusive effect than 
other final judgments. The preeminent authority is the Second Restatement itself 
. . . Other texts march to the same beat. See David L. Shapiro, Civil Procedure: 
Preclusion in Civil Actions 63 (2001) ('[I]ssues not litigated in the declaratory 
action -- perhaps because they were not foreseeable or because the plaintiff was 
seeking only a limited clarification of his rights and duties -- should not be 
foreclosed in a later coercive action arising out of the same controversy.'); see 
also Rosemary Gregor et al., American Jurisprudence 2d Declaratory Judgments 
§ 248 (2d ed. 2003) (similar); James Wm. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice§ 
131.24[3] (3d ed. 2008) (noting that public policy goals are 'furthered when a 
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plaintiff who has sought solelv declarative relief is allowed to seek additional 
coercive relief based on the same claim'); Charles A. Wright & Mary K. Kane, 
Law o/Federal Courts 723-24 (6th ed. 2002) (similar). But cf 18A Charles A. 
Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure§ 
4446 (2d ed. 2002) (noting that 'traditional doctrine has refused to apply claim 
preclusion to an action for declaratory relief alone,' yet criticizing that practice). 
547 F.3d at 57 (emphasis added). 
At the end of its discussion of the Restatement, Stilwyn again wishes the facts were 
different than the actual are: "Anaconda/Portfolio sought a judicial determination of the legal 
rights to the 58% interest in the Stilwyn Loan as against the FDIC. No other claims were made 
and no other parties were included." App. Br. 31. This remarkable statement is unsupportable in 
the record. Stilwyn made itself a party through intervention. The FDIC enlarged the scope of 
the action through its counterclaim for slander of title. These facts prevent Stilwyn from 
resurrecting its claims, even if this Court chose to adopt Restatement (Second) of Judgments§ 
33. 
IDAHO FIRST BANK'S ARGUMENT ON CROSS APPEAL 
A. The District Court erred in not awarding Idaho First Bank attorney fees 
pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-121 
Because Stilwyn continued to pursue those claims which it could have or should have 
brought in the earlier Federal Case, the District Court should have awarded Idaho First its full, 
reasonable attorney fees. Idaho Code § 12-121, together with Rule 54( e )( 1 ), empowers Courts to 
award attorney fees in a case "brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without 
foundation." 
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B. Idaho Code §12-121 Authorizes an Award of Attorney Fees To 
Prevailing Parties. 
Idaho follows the American rule when awarding attorney fees and costs. The American 
rule is that "attorney fees are to be awarded only where they are authorized by statute or 
contract." Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass'n v. Idaho Pub. Util. Comm'n, 125 Idaho 401, 
407,871 P.2d 818, 824 (1994). See Jesse R. Walters, A Primer for Awarding Attorney Fees in 
Idaho, 38 Idaho L. Rev. 1, 14 (2001) (discussing the underlying basis for attorney fee awards). 
Idaho Code Ann. § 12-121 provides that reasonable attorney fees may be awarded to the 
prevailing party or parties in any civil action. Although under I.C. § 12-121 "an award of 
attorney fees is not a matter ofright to the prevailing party," a district court should make an 
award when "'it is left with the abiding belief that the action was pursued, defended, or brought 
frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation."' Garner v. Povey, 151 Idaho 462, 468, 259 
P.3d 608,615 (2011) citing C & G, Inc. v. Rule, 135 Idaho 763, 769, 25 P.3d 76, 82 (2001), 
Michalk v. Michalk, 148 Idaho 224,235,220 P.3d 580, 591(2009) (citing McGrew v. McGrew, 
139 Idaho 551,562, 82 P.3d 833,844 (2003)) and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l) (attorney fees "may be 
awarded by the court only when it finds, from the facts presented to it, that the case was brought, 
pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation .... "). 
In this case, §12-121 and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l) provide a concrete basis for an award of 
attorney fees because Stilwyn's lawsuit was found to be barred by the doctrine of res judicata. 
As noted above, the District Court summarily dispatched Stilwyn's arguments that it did not 
have to file all of its claims as an intervener in the earlier Federal Case. "The Plaintiffs claims 
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are barred by res judicata, specifically claim preclusion, because the claims should have been 
brought in the Federal Case where Stilwyn voluntarily subjected itself to the jurisdictional 
powers of the U.S. District Court for the District ofidaho as an intervener, could have asserted 
the counterclaim, and did attempt to join the counterclaim with the FDIC." R., Vol. V, p. 1095. 
The claims Stilwyn brought in this action no longer existed following entry of the judgment in 
the Federal Case. The claims Stilwyn filed in this lawsuit were unfounded because they had no 
basis in the law and were "inefficient and inappropriate to bring them in state court now," as the 
District Court put it. Id. at 1098. 
C. Idaho First Bank is the Prevailing Party. 
Idaho First prevailed against Stilwyn. "A determination on prevailing parties is 
committed to the discretion of the trial court. "Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC v. Nord Excavating & 
Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 716, 718-19, 117 P.3d 130, 132-33 (2005). I.R.C. P. Rule 54(d)(l)(B) 
guides court inquiries into the prevailing party question. It provides: 
In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and entitled to costs, 
the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider the final judgment or result of 
the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties. The trial court 
in its sound discretion may determine that a part to an action prevailed in part and 
did not prevail in part, and upon so finding may apportion the costs between and 
among the parties in a fair and equitable manner after considering all of the issues 
and claims involved in the action and the resultant judgment or judgments 
attained. 
"[T]he prevailing party question is examined and determined from an overall view, not a 
claim-by-claim analysis." Eighteen Mde Ranch, 141 Idaho at 719, 117 P.3d at 133. The Court 
in Eighteen Mile Ranch explained the value of a decision favorable to defendants as follows: 
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Avoiding liability is a significant benefit to a defendant. In baseball, it is said that 
a walk is as good as a hit. The latter, of course, is more exciting. In litigation, 
avoiding liability is as good for a defendant as winning a money judgment is for a 
plaintiff. The point is, while a plaintiff with a large money judgment may be more 
exalted than a defendant who simply walks out of court no worse for the wear, 
courts must not ignore the value of a successful defense. 
Id See also Advanced Med Diagnostics, LLC v. Imaging Ctr. of Idaho. LLC, No. 39753-2012, 
2013 Ida LEXIS 200, **7, (Idaho June 20, 2013), 303 P.3d 171, 174 (20 l 3)("Defendant was the 
prevailing party in this litigation because Plaintiff's claim, which it lost, was the primary issue in 
the litigation.") and Hobson Fabricating Corp. v. SEIZ Constr., LLC, No. 38202/38216, 2012 
LEXIS 238, ** 13, (Idaho December 19, 2012), 294 P.3d 171, 176 (2012)(" In both Oakes11 and 
Eighteen Mile Ranch, this Court held that the district court abused its discretion by undervaluing 
the successful defense of a claim or counterclaim and deciding that neither party prevailed 
overall.") 
Here, by avoiding all liability as a defendant, Idaho First obtained a result that is 
equivalent to obtaining relief as a plaintiff. Idaho First is, therefore, the prevailing party on all of 
the claims made by Stilwyn against Idaho First. 
D. Stilwyn Unreasonably and Without Foundation Brought and Pursued its Claims 
Against Idaho First Bank 
Under Idaho law, once a defense of res judicata is blatantly apparent, further litigation is 
frivolous, warranting an award of attorney fees. Burns v. Baldwin, 138 Idaho 480, 487, 65 P.3d 
502,509 (2003) citing Cole v. Kunzler, 115 Idaho 552,558, 768 P.2d 815,821 (Ct. App. 1989). 
In Baldwin, a California jury awarded plaintiff damages and a judgment was entered in 
11 Oakes v. Boise Heart Clinic Physicians, 152 Idaho 540,272 P.3d 512 (2012) 
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California. On appeal the judgment was modified to allow post-judgment interest only from a 
specific date. Plaintiff did not appeal that decision and defendant paid the amount of the 
California judgment. Plaintiff then filed the original California judgment in Idaho, attempting to 
recover post-judgment interest that had been disallowed by the California appellate court. The 
Idaho trial court struck the filing of the California judgment and this Court affirmed the decision 
and the award of attorney fees under I.C. § 12-121 and I.R.C.P. 54( e )(1 ). In upholding the lower 
court's attorney fee award, the Court said: 
Burns clearly knew that the foreign judgment which he filed in Idaho had been 
modified and satisfied as a matter of law and that the issues that he raised would 
be barred by the Full Faith and Credit Clause and res judicata. See Cole v. 
Kunzler, 115 Idaho 552, 558, 768 P.2d 815, 821 (Ct. App. 1989) (holding that 
once a defense of res judicata is blatantly apparent, further litigation is frivolous, 
warranting an award of attorney fees). The district court exercised reason in 
arriving at its award of attorney fees. The award of attorney fees was not an abuse 
of discretion and is affirmed. 
Burns, 138 Idaho at 487, 65 P.3d at 509. 
More recently in Berkshire lnvs., LLC v. Taylor, 153 Idaho 73, 278 P.3d 943 (2012) this 
Court found that under I.C. §12-123 and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l), the lower court was correct in 
awarding attorney fees where the claim was pursued frivolously and was barred by a judgment in 
a prior lawsuit. The Court found, "[t]he Mailes' suit before Judge Greenwood was simply an 
attempt to relitigate an issue that had already been decided by this Court. It was also based on 
identical facts as the action before Judge Wilper, so it was clearly barred by both issue and claim 
preclusion." Id. at 86, 278 P.3d at 956. See Fibertection v. Jensen, No. CV-07-245, 2009 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 44578 (D. Idaho May 28, 2009)("Where a party knows or should know that the 
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defense of res judicata will bar its claim, further litigation is frivolous and warrants attorney fees 
under Idaho Code§ 12-121 and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l)".). Similarly, the Court in this case applied the 
doctrine of collateral estoppel to bar relitigation of issues already resolved by the courts in 
Wyoming.)( citations omitted); Sw:face v. Commerce Bank of Hutchinson, 1990 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 11638, *9 (D. Kan. Aug. 17, 1990)("The decision to continue with litigation in this 
indicating that plaintiffs' claims were precluded by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral 
estoppel. The fact that the defendants were required to file a motion for summary judgment 
based on collateral estoppel and res judicata is absurd."); Kahre-Richardes Family Found v. 
Village of Baldwinsville, 953 F. Supp. 39, 42-43 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) ("In their opposition to 
Defendants' motion for summary judgment, Plaintiffs continued to assert that res judicata did not 
apply, despite clear precedent to the contrary. Therefore, in that Plaintiffs continued to litigate 
after it became clear that their action was unreasonable and frivolous, the Court finds that 
Plaintiffs are responsible for Defendants' attorney's fees.") 
This lawsuit constituted a vexatious and calculated effort to re-litigate the issues decided 
in the Federal Case. This was not a case presenting mixed issues oflaw and fact. Bonaparte v. 
Neff, 116 Idaho 60, 64 (Idaho Ct. App. 1989) ("The court in a case presenting mixed issues of 
law and fact, must determine whether the evidence adduced is sufficient to establish a fairly 
debatable issue under the legal theories advanced by the plaintiffs or whether the position 
advanced was plainly fallacious.") citing rrench v. Sorensen, 113 Idaho 950, 751 P.2d 98 (1988) 
and Associates Northwest v. Beets, 112 Idaho 603, 733 P.2d 824 (Ct.App.1987). In dismissing 
Stilwyn' s case, the District Court determined that "no genuine issue as to any material fact 
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exist[ed]." R., Vol. V, p. 1096. The District Court found that Idaho First satisfied all three 
prongs of the test for application of res judicata and that Stilwyn's State Court claims were 
barred. Id. at 1101. The District Court rejected Stilwyn's claim that it was not a party to the 
Federal Case and determined that the parties in the Federal Case and the State Case were the 
same. Id. at 1097. 
As to the second or "same claim" prong, the District Court found that Stilwyn failed to 
bring or could have brought the same claims in the Federal Case that it raised in this case. The 
District Court implied there was a degree of guile in Stilwyn's decision to abandon its Federal 
Case claims, "[Stilwyn] chose to join the Federal Case, it assumed it had the ability to assert the 
claim, it saw there was opposition and apparently tried to maneuver past the opposition." Id. at 
1099. Stilwyn argued in opposition to Idaho First' s summary judgment motion, that there was 
no final judgment in the Federal Case. This Court, however, ruled that the "judgments in the 
Federal Case were final judgments on the merits which decided all issues brought or that could 
have been brought. .. . "Id.at 1100. 
Stilwyn pursued this lawsuit frivolously; the suit had no foundation in law or fact, and 
had no merit because all the claims had been dismissed with prejudice in the Federal Case. This 
is the quintessential case where attorney fees are appropriate under Idaho Code § 12-121 and 
l.R.C.P. 54(e)(l). Stilwyn's claims were plainly fallacious and not fairly debatable, which is the 
standard in Idaho. See Assocs. Nw, Inc. v. Beets, 112 Idaho 603, 605, 733 P.2d 824, 826 (Ct. 
App. 1987). 
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In denying Idaho First' s request for attorney fees, the District Court indicated that there 
were a "number of debatable issues and matters of first impression." R., Vol. V, p. 1301. As the 
foregoing discussion on the applicability of res judicata doctrine suggests, Idaho First 
respectfully submits that the District Court overstated just how debatable the issues raised were. 
As its Memorandum Opinion itself indicates, the District Court had little difficulty in dispensing 
with Stilwyn's futile objections to the operation of res judicata on its claims. Accordingly, the 
District Court erred by not awarding Idaho First its reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to I.C. 
12-121 and Rule 54(e)(l). 
CONCLUSION 
Idaho First Bank respectfully requests that this Court affirm the District Court's entry of 
summary judgment dismissing Stilwyn's claims against it, finding that Idaho First Bank has 
proved all the required elements of claim preclusion and that Stilwyn failed to file its claims in 
the Federal Case. 
Idaho First Bank further respectfully requests that this Court reverse the District Court's 
denial of its motion for an award of attorney fees; that this Court find that Idaho First Bank was a 
prevailing party under Idaho Code§ 12-121 and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l); and, that Stilwyn pursued its 
claims frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation, including fees on appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED This gy of August, 2014. 
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